

Quantum circuits for the CSIDH: optimizing quantum evaluation of isogenies

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Key bits where all known attacks take 2^λ operations
(naive serial attack metric, ignoring memory cost):

	pre-quantum	post-quantum
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- What about memory, using parallel AT metric?

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BS18 claim 2^{71} total gates. We explain gap.