

# Fast, Compact, and Constant-time Discrete Gaussian Sampling over Integers

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- Sampling from  $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z},\sigma}$  for large  $\sigma$ : Base sampler with smaller deviation + Expander.
- Binary Sampling Algorithm [DDLL13]:
  - Base samplers:  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z},\sigma_0}^+$ , and  $y \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\{0, \dots, k-1\})$ , where  $\sigma_0 = \sqrt{1/2 \ln 2}$  and  $k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ .
  - Expander: Compute  $z = kx + y$ . Use a Bernoulli sampler to reject  $z$ , with the acceptance bias:  $p = \exp(-y(y + 2kx)/2\sigma^2)$ .
  - This algorithm will generate  $z \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z},k\sigma_0}^+$ .
  - Side-channel attacks: [BHLY16, PBY17, EFGT17, BDE<sup>+</sup>18].
  - Previous countermeasures:
    - Full-table access [PBY17, EFGT17].
    - Compute  $p$  by using a large look-up table (qTesla [BAA<sup>+</sup>17]).

# Rényi Divergence [Pre17]

- The Bernoulli sampler could fit in double precision (53 bits).
- Efficiency is independent of  $\sigma$  (relies on the number of samples instead).
- The  $\exp(x)$  in C library is not constant-time (floating-point division).

Adapted from [Pre17], Lemma 3 and Eq. 4

For two distributions  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}$  such that  $\text{Supp}(\mathcal{P}) = \text{Supp}(\mathcal{Q})$ , we have:

$$R_\alpha(\mathcal{P}||\mathcal{Q}) \leq 1 + \frac{\alpha \cdot (\Delta(\mathcal{P}||\mathcal{Q}))^2}{2},$$

when  $\Delta(\mathcal{P}||\mathcal{Q}) \rightarrow 0$ . In addition, for  $M$  independent samples, sampling from  $\mathcal{P}$  will be  $\lambda$ -bit secure if  $R_{2^\lambda}(\mathcal{P}||\mathcal{Q}) \leq 1 + 1/(4M)$ . Typically we have  $M = m \cdot q_s$ , where  $m$  is the dimension of the lattice, and  $q_s$  is the number of queries.

# Proposed Techniques

- Use a polynomial to estimate  $\exp(x)$  with sufficient precision instead:

- ① Let  $t = y(y + 2kx)$ . Because  $\sigma_0 = \sqrt{1/(2 \ln 2)}$  and  $\sigma = k\sigma_0$ , we rewrite the Bernoulli bias  $p$  as:


$$p = \exp(-t/2\sigma^2) = \exp(-\ln 2 \cdot t/k^2) = 2^{-t/k^2}.$$

- ② We adapt the techniques from [MBdD<sup>+</sup>10] to estimate  $2^{-t/k^2}$ :


- ①  $2^{-t/k^2} = 2^{\lfloor -t/k^2 \rfloor + a} = 2^{\lfloor -t/k^2 \rfloor} \cdot 2^a$ ,  $0 \leq a < 1$ .
- ② Change the exponent of a double precision variable to get  $2^{\lfloor -t/k^2 \rfloor}$ .
- ③ Use the Sollya tool [CJL10] to find a polynomial with sufficient precision for evaluating  $2^a$ .

# Efficiency Comparison

Comparison of the CPU cycles for different  $\sigma$



Comparison of the Bernoulli table size for different  $\sigma$



- $\lambda = 128$ ,  $m = 1024$ ,  $q_s = 2^{64}$ .
- Use hardware AES-NI PRNG.



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